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of New York found both subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA 
and personal jurisdiction over Talisman as a foreign corporation doing 
business in New York.116 Reaffirming United States and international 
treaty precedent, the Court determined that Talisman could be treated as 
a state actor under the A TCA. 117 The Court expanded subject matter 
jurisdiction under the ATCA by finding that Talisman's cooperation 
with the Sudanese government and Talisman's role as a co-conspirator 
in the genocidal acts committed by the Sudanese government against 
the southern Sudanese populations around oil concessions amounted to 
acts under color of state law for purposes of liability under the 
ATCA.11s 
Rohit Pun} 
V. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov 
A. Introduction 
In Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York recognized the sovereignty and 
independence of the United States judiciary in the international arena. 119 
In its decision, the Court acknowledged the pervasive corruption in the 
Russian legal system and revealed an interest in protecting United 
States business interests.120 In disregarding the decision of the High 
Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, Russia's court of last resort, 
the Court discounted international principles of comity .121 In doing so, 
the Court conveyed intolerance for corruption. 122 Future opinions will 
therefore rely on this decision in order to promote United States 
interests in the international realm and to justify non-recognition of 
foreign judgments. 
116. Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp.2d at 319, 331. 
117. See id. at 308-17, 328-29. 
118. Id. at 328. 
119. Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp.2d 156, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003)[hereinafter Films By Jove]. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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B. Background and Summary of Arguments 
In an August 2001 ruling, the Court awarded summary judgment in 
favor of an American film company, Films By Jove [hereinafter FBJ], 
effectively validating FBJ' s title to over 1,500 Russian animated films 
created by a state-owned enterprise prior to 1991. 123 On appeal, Joseph 
Berov, an American vendor of the films in question and a defendant in 
this action, conceded to violations of copyright law; however, Berov 
maintained that FBJ was not the proper plaintiff in the action against 
him. 124 Specifically, Berov alleged that the Court should reconsider its 
previous grant of summary judgment because of a recent decision by the 
High Arbitrazh Court in Russia [hereinafter Arbitrazh], which credited 
ownership of the copyrights to a third party plaintiff, the Federal State 
Unitarian Enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studio [hereinafter FSUESMS]. 125 
In the instant decision, the Court agreed with FBJ and reaffirmed 
FBJ' s position as the valid titleholder of the copyrights in dispute. 126 
During the trial, the parties offered fundamentally different versions and 
interpretations of the events leading up to the lawsuit. 127 Although the 
case involved copyright infringement, the determination of the proper 
owner of the copyrights at issue controlled the outcome of the case. 12 
FBJ argued that it held a valid title to the copyrights. FBJ alleged 
that, in 1989, the Russian state enterprise that had been controlling the 
studio since 1936 was transformed into a lease entity, conferring a new 
legal status upon it and transferring the ownership of the copyrights. 129 
These events occurred during the period of Perestroika, where the 
Russian government encouraged privatization and liberalization of the 
economy. 130 When the state enterprise was transformed into a lease 
entity, FBJ maintained the state enterprise ceased to exist. 131 
Accordingly, the copyrights in the films passed to the lease entity, 
called Soyuzmultfilm Studio, by operation of law. 132 In 1989, 
Soyuzmultfilm Studio agreed to pay rent to the Russian state in 
exchange for a ten-year lease on the tangible property owned by the 
123. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 158. 
124. Id. at 216-17. 
125. Id. at 178, 164. 
126. Id.at217. 
127. Id. at 161. 
128. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 160. 
129. Id. at 161. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 11
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/11
2004] 2003-2004 Surveys 341 
state. 133 In 1992, Soyuzmultfilm Studio awarded FBJ an exclusive 
license to refurbish and sell the copyrighted films. 134 In 1999, just 
before the ten-year lease expired, Soyuzmultfilm Studio was 
reorganized into a ~rivate company, also called Soyuzmultfilm Studio 
[hereinafter SMS].1 5 Upon termination of the lease, the state property 
that had been leased to Soyuzmultfilm Studio was returned to the state, 
and SMS, the privatized company, moved to another location but 
retained the copyrights that had passed to it as a result of the 
reorganization. 136 Durinf that same year, Russia established a new state 
enterprise: FSUESMS. 13 
Berov, on the other hand, argued that FSUESMS was the successor 
to the original state enterprise and the lawful holder of the copyrights. 138 
He argued that the copyrights to the films were owned by the state and 
never legally passed to Soyuzmultfilm Studio; rather, the copyrights 
"were merely under the 'operative management' of the studio."139 
Accordingly, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio could not have conveyed the 
copyrights to FBJ because it never had the authority to do so.140 Berov 
also denied FBJ' s allegation that the state enterprise ceased to exist, 
arguing instead that the state enterprise experienced a phase of 
"suspended animation" during the ten-year lease and was subsequently 
revived as FSUESMS in 1999 .141 Therefore, Soyuzmultfilm Studio 
could not have legally sold the copyrights to FBJ; instead, the rights 
passed from the original state enterprise to FSUESMS. 142 
C. Discussion 
The Court reaffirmed its previous grant of summary judgment, 
focusing on the flawed logic of the Arbitrazh's decision and the 
allegations of corrupt influence by Russian government upon the 
Russian judiciary. 
133. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 161. 
134. Id. at 160, 162. 
135. Id. at 162. 
136. Id. at 162. 
137. Id. 
138. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 164. 
139. Id. at 163. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 163-64. 
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Logic of the Russian Court's Decision 
The Court decided that the Russian decision was relevant to the 
outcome of Berov's motion for reconsideration because that outcome 
would be dependent upon an issue addressed by the Russian court: the 
legal succession of the ownership of the copyrights.143 Although the 
Court ultimately rejected the logic of the Arbitrazh's decision, the locus 
of the litigation in Arbitrazh pivoted on questions of legal ownership 
necessary for the resolution of this case. 144 
At the hearing, Berov and FBJ each interpreted the significance of 
the Arbitrazh's decision differently. 145 Berov argued that the 
Arbitrazh' s conclusion that the state enterprise continued to exist 
throughout the ten-year lease period negated FBJ's ownership in the 
copyrights. 146 Because the state enterprise retained the copyrights when 
the lease agreement was executed in 1989, the copyrights never passed 
by operation of law to FBJ.147 Berov further argued that according to 
the Arbitrazh, FSUESMS, as the legal successor to the state enterprise, 
owned the disputed rights. 148 FBJ responded by claiming that the 
transfer to FSUESMS applied only to the tangible property mentioned 
in the lease agreement. 149 FBJ argued that the state enterprise could not 
have existed because it lost all the qualities of a commercial entity.150 
The state enterprise during the 1990s had no equipment or office space 
and did not function as an independent commercial enterprise. 151 
Therefore, FBJ asserted, the state enterprise did not exist during the 
lease agreement and the copyrights could not have legally passed to 
FSUESMS. 152 
In support of his argument, Berov pointed to an information letter 
issued by the Arbitrazh that rejected the possibility of automatic legal 
succession to SMS by stating that "legal succession is determined by the 
content of the property, rights and obligations transferred by the 
statement."153 This argument would be "devastating" to FBJ had the 
143. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d. at 179. 
144. Id. at 158, 179, 216. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 179-80. 
147. Id. at 179. 
148. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 179. 
149. Id. at 162. 
150. Id. at 198. 
151. Id. at 180-81. 
152. Id. at 161. 
153. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 182-83. 
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court not distinguished the situation involved in the information letter 
from the one currently in dispute. 154 The reorganization in the 
information letter concerned a studio that was "spun off' from an 
existing state enterprise.155 There, the original entity simultaneously 
existed alongside the new enterprise.156 In the current action, the 
commercial activity of the state enterprise ceased with the signing of the 
lease agreement. 157 
The Court found the Arbitrazh's decision inconsistent in several 
ways. The lack of activity on the part of the state enterprise suggests 
that the state enterprise did, in fact, cease to exist. 158 Moreover, the 
Court found FBJ's expert, Dr. Sergei Pashin, convincing.159 Dr. Pashin 
claimed that the Arbitrazh decision misrepresented the law and 
ultimately came to a decision that was "unprecedented and illogical."160 
Dr. Pashin further declared that the Arbitrazh decision was an attempt 
through collusion to protect state interests, stating that the decision 
"allowed the organs of the executive branch to interpret this decision in 
any manner they deemed fit, which would be for the purpose of 
protecting what is specifically understood to be 'state interest. '"161 At 
the time the lease agreement was executed, the Russian government had 
created the Fundamental Principles on Leasing [hereinafter Principles] 
to encourage privatization of state industries.162 According to Dr. 
Pashin, the ruling of the Arbitrazh conflicted with the purpose of the 
Principles. 163 
The Court also found the Arbitrazh decision to be inconsistent 
because the record established that the copyrights were never state-
owned property.164 Under Article 486 of the 1964 Soviet Civil Code, 
which provides that ownership of copyrights rests with the entity that 
created the films, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio clearly owned the 
copyrights.165 Therefore, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio legally owned the 
154. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 183. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 184. 
158. Id. at 197. 
159. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 210. 
160. Id. at 198. 
161. Id. at 199. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 193, 197, 204. 
164. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201. 
165. Id. 
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copyrights while the state retained the right to exploit the distribution. 166 
However, during Perestroika, the right to distribute the films combined 
with the right to hold the copyrights. 167 Since the Soviet state did not 
own the copyrights in the first place, the rights could not have been 
involved in the 1989 lease agreement because the copyrights remained 
with the studio that produced the films rather than the state. 168 
According to the Court, the fatal ·flaw in the Arbitrazh' s decision 
arose from the implication that the copyrights remained with the state 
after the state-owned entity ceased to exist. 169 If the Court adopted the 
Arbitrazh' s reasoning, there would have been no entity authorized to 
grant the copyrights· during the lease-agreement ·period. 170 If the state 
enterprise was in "suspended animation," and the lease enterprise did 
not have the rights to the copyrights, then at no point during the ten-year 
lease would there have been an entity legally authorized to distribute the 
copyrights. 171 
Judicial Misconduct 
Central to FBJ' s argument is the allegation of insidious corruption 
in the Russian judiciary system. 172 Specifically, FBJ accused the state 
of exerting "improper governmental influence" over the Russian 
courts. 173 The decision was depicted as an attempt to protect Russian 
state interests to the detriment of the American company. 174 FBJ' s 
expert, Dr. Pashin, gave a convincing description of the state of the 
Russian judiciary, revealing that the composition of the Arbitrazh 
consists mostly of fonner state employees specifically hired to protect 
state interests. 175 Additionally, the Arbitrazh courts lack adequate 
funding and are dependent upon the state for resources. 176 This 
facilitates a relationship in which the judiciary is unduly influenced by 
pro-state concerns. 177 
The courts of the United States, interested in protecting citizens 
166. Id. 
167. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201. 
168. Id. at 202. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 204. 
171. Id. at 181, 204. 
172. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 205. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 205-06. 
175. Id. at 206. 
176. Id. 
177. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 206. 
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and companies of the United States, can reject foreign judgments when 
evidence exists that the judgment was influenced by corrupt forces. 178 
Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
supports this conclusion by stipulating that if a foreign court fails to be 
fair or impartial, the United States court is not bound to follow it. 179 
Here, FBJ produced evidence of impropriety on the part of the Russian 
courts. Several documents detailed a meeting between the deputy 
chairman of the Russian Federation and a representative from the 
Arbitrazh where the litigation between SMS and FSUESMS, as well as 
the need to protect state interests, were addressed. 180 The documents 
demonstrated improper influence and justified the United States court's 
decision not to defer to the Russian judgment. 
F. Holding of the Court 
The Court denied Berov's motion for reconsideration, basing its 
determination on the flawed logic of the court and viable allegations of 
judicial misconduct. 181 
G. Conclusion 
In declining to defer to the Arbitrazh' s decision and 
acknowledging the political corruption of the Arbitrazh, the Court 
highlighted the paramount importance of United States business 
interests and the judiciary's protectionist role in international law. In 
addition, by refusing to defer to the Russian decision, the Court made a 
political point and demonstrated its intolerance for judicial corruption. 
P. Carey Kulp 
VI. NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT 
United States of America v. Schultz 
A. Introduction 
In United States of America v. Schultz, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether conspiring to take 
178. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 207. 
179. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b 
(1987)). 
180. Id. at 208. 
181. Id. at 216. 
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